St. John's Law Review
Volume 41, January 1967, Number 3

Article 18

CPLR 302(a)(1): New York Default Judgment Collaterally Attacked
in New Jersey
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

1967 ]

NEW YORK PRACTICE COVERAGE

473

local retailer could foresee New York consequences due to a defect
in the tire. The Conference concluded that New York would
have power under the federal constitution to exercise personal
jurisdiction over the retailer, but, as a matter of policy, it would
be undesirable to do so.25 Yet, if the retailer were a large
corporation with extensive contacts in New York, or did extensive
business in interstate commerce, the Conference believed that it
would be fair (and constitutional) to exercise jurisdiction.
It would seem that in the case of the local Nebraska retailer,
the court could not exercise jurisdiction because of a lack of
"minimum contacts," as that term has been earlier defined. The
additional factor that the retailer was doing business in interstate
or international commerce (CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii)) would not seem
to change the situation.
However, neither the CPLR Committee of the Judicial Conference, the Conference itself, nor the legislature was unaware of
these problems of potential unconstitutionality. But the absence
of clear United States Supreme Court guidelines made it necessary
-in view of the general legislative intent to expand jurisdictional
bases in the amended 302-to step forward with an approach
which would realize the intent while at the same time would honor
constitutional requirements whose limits have yet to be authoritatively defined. The dividing line is hazy, for which reason the
amendment may in certain cases go beyond it, and thus fail of
its purpose. But it will fail only in the individual case. CPLR
10004 will see to it that it does not fail in its entirety. The
amendment is, in short, an invitation to the courts to press the
long-arm tort sphere to whatever limits they think the United
States Supreme Court will accept.
CPLR 302(a)(1):

New York default judgment collaterally
attacked in New Jersey.

In J. W. Sparks & Co. v. Gallos,26 a New York stock
brokerage firm brought an action in New Jersey to enforce a New
York default judgment. The defendant collaterally attacked the
jurisdiction of the New York court. Jurisdiction over the defendant
the
in the original action had been acquired under Section 404,
27
long-arm provision of the New York City Civil Court Act.
This case is one of the first recorded decisions of a foreign
forum faced with a default judgment under New York's long-arm
statute. The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that although
25 Id.at 136.
26 47 N.J. 295, 220 A.2d 673 (1966).
27 This section is the New York City Civil Court Act's counterpart of
CPLR 302.
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New York could have constitutionally exercised jurisdiction in the
instant case,"' whether or not the facts presented were encompassed
by its long-arm statute should be determined by the New York
courts.&2 9 In view of its holding, the New Jersey court requested
the New York courts to re-open the prior default judgment. The
New York court in rendering the default judgment had not
discussed the jurisdictional question in the case. In addition, there
was no prior controlling decision in New York on a similar factual
situation. However, the New Jersey court stated that if the New
York courts declined to re-open the judgment, the plaintiff could
enforce the judgment within the New Jersey courts without a
further discussion of the jurisdictional question.
The instant case illustrates the role which a foreign tribunal
may play in the interpretation of New York's long-arm statutes.
In all actions seeking to enforce default judgments in the defendant's home state, the foreign court will have to decide whether
there was a valid exercise of jurisdiction by the New York court.
The instant case indicates that, as long as an exercise of jurisdiction
is constitutional, a foreign court will affirm the jurisdiction of a
New York court if, in the foreign court's opinion, the facts could
be encompassed by the New York statute. It should be noted
that this case involved the defendant's purchase of stock in a New
Jersey branch office of a New York brokerage firm. The practical
effect of this application of CPLR 302 is to subject all purchasers
of stock dealing through a New York brokerage firm to in personam
jurisdiction in this state.
CPLR 302(a)(2): Omissions outside New York not a tortious
act within the state.
In Platt Corp. v. Platt,36 plaintiff brought an action in tort
against a non-domiciliary director of a New York corporation,
basing jurisdiction on CPLR 302 (a) (2). It was alleged that
the defendant remained in Florida and caused plaintiff corporation injury by his failure to attend board meetings in New York,
and his failure to perform in New York any of his other duties
as a director. The Court of Appeals, in reversing the appellate
division, held that CPLR 302 (a) (2) could not be used as a basis
for jurisdiction since this section requires that a tortious act be
committed within the state.
28

For cases establishing the permissible constitutional limits of long-arm

statutes see, e.g., Hanson v. Denclda, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) ; McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
29 The New York courts have held that CPLR 302(a) has not extended
New York's jurisdiction to the constitutional limit. A. Millner Co. v.
Noudar, LDA, 24 App. Div. 2d 326, 266 N.Y.S2d 289 (1st Dep't 1966).
so 17 N.Y.2d 234, 217 N.E.2d 134, 270 N.Y.S.2d 408 (1966).

